Kļūdainu priekšstatu loma preventīva kara uzsākšanā: Sešu dienu kara analīze
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Rīgas Stradiņa universitāte
Rīga Stradiņš University
Rīga Stradiņš University
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Bakalaura darbs ar nosaukumu – Kļūdainu priekšstatu loma preventīva kara uzsākšanā.
Šī darba aktualitāte ir pārbaudīt, vai tieši kļūdaini priekšstati bija tas faktors, kas radīja militāro eskalāciju, ko neviena puse sākotnēji neplānoja.
Šī darba mērķis - izpētīt kļūdainu priekšstatu nozīmi un motivāciju, Izraēlas lēmumā uzbrukt Ēģiptei 1967. gada 05. jūnijā.
Izvirzītā hipotēze – Izraēlas lēmums veikt preventīvu uzbrukumu Ēģiptei 1967.gada 05.jūnijā ir saistīts ar kļūdainu priekšstatu par Ēģiptes gatavošanos uzbrukt Izraēlai.
Lai sasniegtu nosprausto mērķi, nepieciešams risināt sekojošus uzdevumus:
Analizēt ASV politiskās zinātnes profesora Roberta Džervis literatūru, par kļūdainu priekšstatu lomu lēmumu pieņemšanā, veidojot teorētisko pētījuma ietvaru;
Aprakstīt Sešu dienu kara izcelšanos un norisi, Ēģiptes bruņoto spēku sagatavotību attiecībā pret Izraēlas bruņotajiem spēkiem, un balstoties uz primāro un sekundāro avotu analīzi, novērtēt vai Izraēlas lēmums veikt preventīvu uzbrukumu bija saistīts ar kļūdainiem priekšstatiem.
Darba apjoms un struktūra:
Pirmajā nodaļā un tās apakšnodaļās ir teorētiski analizēta starptautisko attiecību defensīvā reālisma teorija un kļūdainu priekšstatu lomu, kas motivē valstis rīkoties agresīvi, paskaidrojot kā veidojas valstu uztveres kļūdas, ārējo apdraudējumu uztvere, orientācija uz valsts aizsardzību, valstu politiskā rīcība.
Otrajā nodaļā un tās apakšnodaļās autors apskata Sešu dienu kara izcelšanās cēloņus, un novērtē valstu militāro sagatavotību uzbrukumam.
Trešajā nodaļā un tās apakšnodaļās autors veic dokumentu saturu analīzi, lai noteiktu, vai Izraēlas lēmums veikt preventīvu uzbrukumu bija balstīts kļūdainos priekšstatos.
Galvenie secinājumi: Izraēla savu lēmumu preventīva kara uzsākšanai, balstīja kļūdainos priekšstatos attiecībā uz Ēģiptes nodomiem, jo pārinterpretēja pieejamo informāciju, un uzskatīja, ka tiek apdraudēta valsts eksistence.
Title of the Bachelor’s Thesis: The Role of Misconceptions in Launching Preventive War: An Analysis of the Six-Day War. The purpose of this research is to examine whether misperceptions were the decisive factor that led to a military escalation. The main objective of this thesis - to explore the significance and influence of misperceptions in Israel’s decision to launch an attack against Egypt on June 5, 1967. Hypothesis - Israel’s decision to carry out a preventive strike against Egypt on June 5, 1967, was influenced by a misperception that Egypt was preparing to launch an attack against Israel. In order to achieve the stated objective, the following tasks must be undertaken:: To analyze the literature of U.S. political scientist Robert Jervis on the role of misperceptions in decision-making, thereby establishing the theoretical framework of the study; To describe the origins and course of the Six-Day War, assess the military preparedness of the Egyptian armed forces in comparison to the Israeli armed forces, and—based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources—evaluate whether Israel’s decision to carry out a preventive strike was influenced by misperceptions. Scope and structure of the Thesis: Chapter One and its subsections provide a theoretical analysis of the defensive realism theory in international relations and the role of misperceptions in motivating states to act aggressively. The chapter explains how perceptual errors emerge in state decision-making, how external threats are perceived, how states orient themselves toward national defense, and how this influences their political behavior. Chapter Two and its subsections examine the causes of the outbreak of the Six-Day War and assess the military preparedness of the states involved for offensive operations. Chapter Three and its subsections present a content analysis of relevant documents in order to determine whether Israel’s decision to carry out a preventive strike was based on misperceptions. Conclusions: Israel's decision to initiate a preventive war was based on misperceptions regarding Egypt's intentions, as the available information was misinterpreted, leading Israel to believe that the very existence of the state was under imminent threat.
Title of the Bachelor’s Thesis: The Role of Misconceptions in Launching Preventive War: An Analysis of the Six-Day War. The purpose of this research is to examine whether misperceptions were the decisive factor that led to a military escalation. The main objective of this thesis - to explore the significance and influence of misperceptions in Israel’s decision to launch an attack against Egypt on June 5, 1967. Hypothesis - Israel’s decision to carry out a preventive strike against Egypt on June 5, 1967, was influenced by a misperception that Egypt was preparing to launch an attack against Israel. In order to achieve the stated objective, the following tasks must be undertaken:: To analyze the literature of U.S. political scientist Robert Jervis on the role of misperceptions in decision-making, thereby establishing the theoretical framework of the study; To describe the origins and course of the Six-Day War, assess the military preparedness of the Egyptian armed forces in comparison to the Israeli armed forces, and—based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources—evaluate whether Israel’s decision to carry out a preventive strike was influenced by misperceptions. Scope and structure of the Thesis: Chapter One and its subsections provide a theoretical analysis of the defensive realism theory in international relations and the role of misperceptions in motivating states to act aggressively. The chapter explains how perceptual errors emerge in state decision-making, how external threats are perceived, how states orient themselves toward national defense, and how this influences their political behavior. Chapter Two and its subsections examine the causes of the outbreak of the Six-Day War and assess the military preparedness of the states involved for offensive operations. Chapter Three and its subsections present a content analysis of relevant documents in order to determine whether Israel’s decision to carry out a preventive strike was based on misperceptions. Conclusions: Israel's decision to initiate a preventive war was based on misperceptions regarding Egypt's intentions, as the available information was misinterpreted, leading Israel to believe that the very existence of the state was under imminent threat.
Description
Starptautiskās attiecības - Eiropas studijas
International Relations - European Studies
Socioloģija, politoloģija un antropoloģija
Sociology, Politics and Anthropology
International Relations - European Studies
Socioloģija, politoloģija un antropoloģija
Sociology, Politics and Anthropology