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**Transformation of the Cognitive Script
of Latvia's Defence Sector on the Common
Security and Defence Policy
of the European Union (2004–2020)**

Summary of the Doctoral Thesis for obtaining a doctoral
degree “Doctor of Science (*Ph.D.*)”

Sector – Political Science
Sub-Sector – International Politics

Rīga, 2022



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The Doctoral Thesis was developed at Rīga Stradiņš University, Latvia

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Defence of the Doctoral Thesis will take place at the public session of the Doctoral Council of Political science on 11 April 2022 at 15.00 online via Zoom platform

The Doctoral Thesis is available in RSU Library and on RSU website:
<https://www.rsu.lv/en/dissertations>

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Introduction

One of the responsibilities of the state is the implementation of peace and peaceful coexistence, as well as ensuring security. Security is particularly significant. It means a situation and conditions so that there is no threat and no exposure to danger. In view of Latvia's historical experience, security is particularly important. It is a question of national sovereignty and existence. Countries have the right to individual and collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack. At the same time, when designing the security and defence policy, the external environment cannot be separated from the internal situation in the country.

The use of force between countries changes the existing order and requires a review of their interrelationships, security and defence policies, and it affects the institutional framework of defence policy and the thinking of this framework by creating a certain template or script. Institutions play an important role in policy outcomes. This is visible in the institutional system of public administration with shared institutional responsibilities in the development and implementation of public policy. In the public administration system, the ministerial level is the highest institutional level with a number of other subordinated institutions of public administration. In the design and implementation of national policies, institutions are not detached from events within and outside the country.

The major turmoil in recent years for Latvia's security and defence policy was Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union (hereinafter – the EU), and the ambiguous policy of the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump. The Covid-19 pandemic has played no less important role in the security dimension, affecting also the field of defence. Russia's aggression in Ukraine had a particular impact not only on the defence policies of individual countries, but also on the policies

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon – European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)).

A wide range of institutions and officials are involved in the development of Latvia's security and defence policy as a single organism. Latvia's defence sector is selected as the central element for the analysis of the Thesis. It is a special sector because its institutions have a specific military culture. The defence institutions are like small societies, different from the general framework of society. It is relatively isolated and characterized by both civilian and military organizational aspects. Within the framework of sociological institutionalism, it is explored how specific situations and cases are perceived within the institutional structure and framework, and how these situations and events are affected and changed in decision-making. Institutional actors are guided by a certain cognitive script, which they can also change at the same time.

The development and implementation of Latvia's defence policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence of Latvia (hereinafter – the Ministry of Defence). Latvia's defence policy is based on several elements. It is the membership in NATO, Latvia's own defence capacity, as well as Latvia's involvement in the CSDP, and the instruments – tools it provides. Latvia has gradually become aware of its place, role and opportunities in shaping its security and defence policy. It began with following the guidelines for integration in EU and NATO, continuing with greater involvement and becoming an equal partner with other countries on later stages. Latvia's security and defence policy is defined in the Latvian National Security Concepts (hereinafter – NSC) and the Latvian National Defence Concepts (hereinafter – NDC). The NSC is prepared by the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia, while the NDC, based on military threat analysis, is prepared by the Ministry of Defence.

Both documents are approved by the Saeima (Parliament). The conceptual national defence documents include the basic principles of defence policy, defining guidelines and other aspects of defence policy. That way, the policy guidelines during its development can be traced and identified.

The EU is one of Latvia's defence and security systems, based on the CSDP with various cooperation opportunities or clusters. When planning and determining the defence policy, the Ministry of Defence of Latvia must consider the commitments and opportunities undertaken by Latvia, including the CSDP. As the CSDP gradually expands and changes, so does the defence policy on the national level, including the cognitive script on the CSDP. The institutional framework of the defence sector is specific with a certain cognitive script. Norms and values, by repeating them, become an unconscious cognitive script. By repeating the action, the actors internalize the norms and follow the cognitive script.

The **aim of the Doctoral Thesis** is to study the transformation of the institutional cognitive script of Latvia's defence sector on the CSDP for the period from 2004 to 2020.

The following **tasks** have been set to fulfil the objective:

- 1) to study the development of the new institutionalism and the essential aspects of the most important trends;
- 2) to find out the logic of appropriateness of sociological institutionalism and the cognitive script in the context of the defence sector;
- 3) to carry out research on the CSDP as the framework influencing the institutional cognitive script;
- 4) to find out the the formal nature of the transformation of the cognitive script of the Latvia's defence sector on the CSDP and its expression through practical capability elements;

- 5) to analyze the role of decision-makers in the Latvia's defence sector in the transformation of cognitive script on CSDP.

In view of the above, the following **hypotheses** of the Doctoral Theses are put forward:

- 1) The convergence of the institutional cognitive script of the Latvia's defence sector with the CSDP began after the Lisbon Treaty had come into force;
- 2) The highest officials of the Ministry of Defence have played the decisive role in the convergence of the cognitive scripts of the Latvia's defence sector with the CSDP;
- 3) The convergence of the institutional cognitive script of Latvia's defence sector with the CSDP was promoted by the maturity of thinking of Ministry of Defence and the Russian military aggression in Ukraine.

The research has been carried out with qualitative research methods – document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The study includes extensive research and evaluation of theoretical literature, international agreements, regulatory enactments, policy planning documents, and empirical research on the development of the CSDP and Latvia's defence policy.

A total of 21 semi-structured interviews have been conducted with the Latvia's defence policy officials and researchers who have been directly or indirectly involved in decision-making and issues related to Latvia's defence policy and CSDP. Some of the interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity, and two officials from the Ministry of Defence were interviewed twice to clarify certain issues. In order to ensure the connection of the theoretical part with the empirical part of the Thesis a wide range of officials from various institutions (including the MoD, the Saeima, representatives of Latvia in the EU institutions) was covered during the interviews, and

the interview questions were structured and designed to find out the nuances of the CSDP during the term of office of a particular official. A number of interviewed officials have held high positions not only in Latvia, including in defence-related positions, but also in the EU and NATO institutions, which significantly expands their competence and vision of the Latvia's defence sector and the institutional thinking of the Latvia's defence sector on CSDP. The interviews conducted with the ministers of defence V. Kristovkis, I. Lieģis, R. Vējonis, R. Bergmanis and A. Pabriks, as well as the former commander of the Latvian National Armed Forces (hereinafter – NAF) R. Graube should be highlighted in particular. The information obtained in the interviews, in conjunction with the other methods used, makes it possible to identify important aspects of the transformation of the cognitive script of Latvia's defence sector on CSDP.

For the interpretation of the obtained information, identification of correlations and tendencies, the content analysis – a quantitative research method is also used in the work. An important part of the work analyses the policy planning and policy documents, as well as regulatory enactments and semi-structured interviews with current and former officials of Latvia's defence policy.

The **novelty of the Thesis** can be seen in several aspects. By the concept of the cognitive script, the author explores Latvia's defence sector cognitive script on the CSDP, which has not been studied so far. Examining the issues of Latvia's defence policy and CSDP, the author of this Paper failed to identify any works on the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script, including CSDP (it was identified that the sociological institutionalism used in the dissertation has so far been used in Latvia in the study of local government cooperation). This study also provides an insight into the specifics of thinking in Latvia's defence sector. Thus, aspects of Latvia's defence sector decision-making on the CSDP

and the framework within which senior officials in the sector operate are identified. With a comprehensive analysis of the new institutionalism, focusing on the cognitive script of sociological institutionalism, specific aspects of institutional activity can be identified. The central element of this work is the institution, identifying such an important aspect as its cognitive script. As the cognitive script is something abstract, a broader analysis is made, looking beyond the formalized institutional structure and functioning. From the theoretical point of view, the topic of the dissertation actualizes the issues of the new institutionalism, the logic of appropriateness of sociological institutionalism, and a wide section of the dissertation is devoted to the institutional thinking or cognitive (thinking) script. The concept of the cognitive script, viewed as a separate aspect in a study of the defence sector, has been developed by Tom Dyson in his work “The Politics of German Defence and Security. Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post-Cold War Era”. The study concludes that German defence ministers follow a cognitive script and are guided by historically based ideas on what should and has to be done.

The importance of the CSDP in Latvia's defence policy has gradually increased, expanding the need to clarify various nuances within the framework of Latvia's defence policy. Including the research of cognitive script on CSDP. Involvement in the CSDP is a challenge for Latvia, as NATO membership is a top priority. Upon joining the EU, Latvia made certain commitments, and the CSDP is one of the EU's policies. The planning and implementation of Latvia's defence policy has a special role, as the outcome of the policy is determined, thus the institutional aspect is important for research. The results obtained in the course of this work provide not only an insight into the thinking of the Latvia's defence sector and the institutional cognitive script about the CSDP, but also identify aspects of the development of Latvia's defence policy and

CSDP. At the same time, it is an investment in research on the Latvia's defence sector, the cognitive script on the CSDP is identified, and this is a contribution to research on the actions of defence policy makers in Latvia.

The position that Latvia's defence policy is based on membership in NATO, while the EU has a complementary role with the CSDP, has been a dogma since Latvia's accession to NATO and accession to the EU. Also, in terms of research in the field of Latvia's defence policy, less attention has been paid to CSDP research compared to NATO. Nevertheless, the research of the CSDP and Latvia's defence policy is topical and is receiving increasing attention. Examples are Žaneta Ozolina's article "European Security and Defence Policy: The Latvian Perspective", Artis Pabriks' article "EU and NATO Integration – the Only Solution to Modern Security Challenges", Airis Rikveilis's article "Latvia and its Strategic Culture. Another View of the EU Security Identity", Edgars Kiukucāns's article "Latvia and the CSDP", Māris Andžāns's article "Prospects of the Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union: Perspectives from Latvia" and "Latvia. Strategic Autonomy and the Defence of Europe. On the Road to a European Army?", Article by Toms Rostoks "Europeanization in Latvia's Foreign Policy". It should be noted, in particular, that since 2011, issues concerning Latvia's interests in the EU, including Latvia's defence policy and the CSDP, have been addressed in the publication "Latvia's Interests in the European Union".

A prominent direction in the research of issues related to institutions is the new institutionalism. One of its types is the sociological institutionalism. In the first chapter, guided by the works of James G. March, Johan P. Olsen, Guy B. Peters, Theda Skocpol, Peter A. Hall, and Rosemary C. Taylor, and other authors on institutionalism, the place of institutionalism is marked among the most important theories of international relations, the development of

institutions and institutionalism is examined, as well as the most important aspects of the new trends of institutionalism are evaluated. When evaluating the sociological institutionalism, the author has highlighted the logic of appropriateness, the specifics of the defence sector and the cognitive script as an aspect of sociological institutionalism. The first chapter outlines the most relevant theoretical aspects of the empirical analysis to test the hypotheses.

In the second chapter, based on the works by Alyson J. Bails, Michael E. Smith, Jolyon Howorth, Hermann Blanke and others authors, and by analysing documents, the CSDP as a framework influencing the cognitive script is explored. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, the CSDP has gradually evolved. It is part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter – CFSP). The EU's security and defence strategy has also gradually evolved from the understanding of peaceful coexistence, when the first European Security Strategy "A secure Europe in a better world" was adopted in 2003, to the need for military capabilities manifested in the EU's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy 2016. In the EU Member States, issues related to the CSDP became particularly advanced after the Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 and the launch of UK's withdrawal from the EU. The most important of these are the creation of the European army, the EU's strategic autonomy, the EU's military capabilities, the European Defence Fund (hereinafter – EDF), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (hereinafter – PESCO) and the European Intervention Initiative (hereinafter – EI2). The analysis of the framework influencing the CSDP as an institutional model of thinking includes a comparative analysis of the transformation of the EU Security and Defence Strategy, research of the CSDP legal basis, procedures and institutional framework, analysis of the development and expansion of CSDP capability elements. Thus, as a precondition, the empirical aspects of the transformation of the institutional cognitive script of the Latvia's defence sector

into the CSDP are marked in order to test the hypotheses put forward in the work.

Considering the time of Latvia's accession to the EU, the chronological limit of this work for empirical research is from 2004 to 2020. Although the boundaries of the analyzed period have been defined, in some parts of the work the author also provides an insight into the historical development of the CSDP and Latvia's security and defence policy. This study is embedded in the common field of research on Latvia's security and defence policy. It is a contribution to research into new institutionalism and the CSDP. The third chapter, based on the document analysis, interviews and the research of the previous chapters, analyses the formal nature of the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script. In doing so, the strategic documents, regulatory, procedural and institutional framework of Latvia's defence policy are examined. The chapter explores the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script through practical capability elements, as well as the role and impact of the decision-makers of Latvia's defence sector on cognitive script on the CSDP.

1 Institutional cognitive script and defence institutions

This chapter consists of the following subsections: 1.1 Institutionalism among the most important theories of political science and international relations; 1.2 Institutions through the Prism of the Development of Old and New Institutionalism; 1.3 The most important aspects of institutional research trends; 1.4. Basic trends of institutional research and institutions in sociological institutionalism; 1.4.1 The most important aspects of the basic trends of institutional research; 1.4.2 Sociological institutionalism and the specifics of the defence sector; 1.4.3 Cognitive script as an aspect of sociological institutionalism and a framework for further analysis.

The comprehensive explanation of the directions of the research on institutions made in the first chapter of the Dissertation has allowed to mark the development tendencies of institutionalism and to identify the most important features of sociological institutionalism for further analysis. The new institutionalism has competing trends. They are called the new institutionalism. Of these, sociological, rational choices and historical institutionalism are the main trends. The central element that unites all approaches and allows them to be called the new institutionalism, as well as to distinguish it from the old institutionalism, is the dogma that institutions are important. Regarding sociological institutionalism, Simon Bulmer, Owen Parker, Ian Bache, Stephen George and Charlotte Burns point out that it is in the middle between positivism and post-positivism, because in their opinion, from the ontological aspect, social reality is mostly socially constructed, while from the epistemological aspect – knowledge can be acquired through objective observations. Reality is socially constructed, and institutions, as part of it, are important, they interact with and are not detached from the surrounding reality. Institutions are the central element of the new institutionalism. In the social sciences, it is not possible to fully or is possible only partially to identify the

features and limits of the phenomenon under study. From the point of view of institutions, it is possible to observe their formalized nature, while the thinking of senior officials of institutions and the aspect of institutional cognitive script can be identified only partially.

Not always the institutional research has been the focus of attention, but they form an important part, a much broader and deeper understanding of the complex social reality. Institutional research has changed rapidly over the last 50 years and has become increasingly important. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen are considered to be the founders of new institutionalism. The cyclical nature of its development is divided into the new and the old institutionalism, as well as into three periods: the period of exploration and rediscovery from the 1930s to the 1970s, the period of divergence and division from the 1980s to the 1990s, the period of convergence and consolidation from the beginning of 2000s to the present day. There are various trends in the new institutionalism. From all of them basic strands are: historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism is based on the logic of calculation, historical institutionalism – on the path dependence, and sociological institutionalism – on the logic of appropriateness.

Sociological institutionalism is characterized by the logic of appropriateness. According to it, the norms and formal rules of the institutions influence and shape the actions of the actors. They operate within their framework. Institutions form their actors under different rules. When making a decision, they can interpret and choose different factors and the potential impact of the decision. Within a certain institutional framework, actors follow the logic of appropriateness, guided by the principles of suitability and appropriateness. The logic of appropriateness perceives a human action as rule-based, but it also includes a cognitive component. The rules are observed because they are natural, correct, expected and legal. Actors try to observe the

rules because they are related to their role in the context of the institution, identity, belonging to a particular political community (group), ethnos, practice and expectations of the institution. The rules form a certain framework, they are legal, natural and correct. Proper action means acting in accordance with institutionalized practice based on an understanding of what is right, reasonable, natural and appropriate.

The state system consists of different institutions, each based on its own principles and rules. They have autonomy over a certain area of responsibility. The rules are variable. They evolve over time according to a specific situation and experience. Experience is included in the rules, and rules – in principles. They represent a specific system. Changes to the rules may be due to new experiences, as the previous regulation does not provide adequate answers to what is right and wrong, bad or good. Actors of the institution learn from shocks, new experiences, crises, etc. This is how a certain institutional maturity is gradually reached.

The aspect of the cognitive script of sociological institutionalism is an element that distinguishes sociological institutionalism in particular from other forms of new institutionalism. Norms and values influence everyday behavior, which repeatedly becomes a pattern of unconscious thinking. By repeating the action according to the institution, the actors internalize the norms and follow the cognitive script. The thinking templates or cognitive scripts (scenario, scheme, template) are actions with a related sequence (set) that characterize frequently experienced events and result in expectations, as well as determine the behavior actions in everyday situations. The experience of events, by repeating, creates an internalized “script” for the possible sequence of actions (activities) for the participants (actors) involved. Scripts are instructions for actions, a set of sequential actions.

Scripts help actors understand situations based on past experience and using prior knowledge to achieve a goal (outcome). Scripts are acquired through participation and observation throughout life, they are activated through the recognition of similarities and previous experiences. Over time, institutions develop a certain cognitive script that is identifiable and different for each institution. It is also variable. Changes in the cognitive script are influenced by internal and external factors. Institutions are a kind of conditional filter through which information is processed, assessing both the internal and external dimensions that underpin a particular outcome.

Military institutions have been one of the oldest and most prominent areas of research in formal organizations, attracting widespread interest from social science researchers. The importance of institutions in the field of defence should be noted J. Howorth points out that military capabilities are useless without institutions. The defence sector, with its military organizations, has a specific, distinct and professional culture that is relatively isolated from society. It is characterized by aspects of military organization: hierarchy, discipline and control, the need to be able to operate even in the most difficult conditions, responsibility for national security and defence, a specific regulatory framework. Military culture and the institutional framework of the defence sector vary from country to country. It explains a common vision of the environment, it refers to values and priorities, ideas, interpretations and norms, it is spread in certain groups, and it can also be like programming collective thinking, separating different groups. Those involved in the defence sector are different from the general framework of society, and the institutions of the defence sector, in developing the defence policy, influence not only the institutional framework of the sector as a whole, but also society as a whole. With sociological institutionalism, it is possible to learn the cognitive script of the defence sector.

2 Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union as a framework affecting the institutional cognitive script

This chapter consists of the following subsections: 2.1 Thinking about the European Union's security and defence policy: transforming the strategy from a comparative perspective; 2.1.1 Thinking about the European Union's security and defence policy: a strategy before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon; 2.1.2 Thinking about the European Union's security and defence policy: a strategy for the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon; 2.2 The framework of the European Union's common security and defence policy: legal basis, procedures and institutional aspects; 2.2.1 Legal basis and procedures for thinking about the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy; 2.2.2 Institutional aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union; 2.3 Development and enlargement of the European Union's defence capabilities and response instruments; 2.3.1 Basic tools for the European Union's defence capabilities and response: European Union military missions and operations and European Union Battlegroups; 2.3.2 European Union Defence Capabilities and Response Instruments following the Russian aggression in Ukraine and in the context of Covid-19: Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund.

The CSDP package consists of the documents (strategies) that define security and defence policy. They outline the challenges, set out the guidelines and a vision for the future. They also include the guiding idea of the CSDP and its development. The first European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World” was adopted in 2003. The findings of the EU High Representative are summarized in the December 2008 implementation report “Providing Security in a Changing World”. The European Security Strategy was not revised or supplemented until 2016, when the EU Global Strategy was

adopted. After the first European Security Strategy was adopted in 2003, it took almost 13 years for the EU's Global Strategy to be approved in 2016. The regulatory, procedural and institutional framework also provides a fundamental basis for the CSDP. The legal basis for the CFSP and CSDP is the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union), which entered into force in 1993. This is the basis for current cooperation in the security and defence sphere. The most significant changes to the Maastricht Treaty were made by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, which entered into force in 1999, and the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007, which in turn entered into force at the end of 2009. The Maastricht Treaty has a separate chapter on CSDP. This is a wide field of rules governing the CSDP.

In line with the logic of appropriateness, the CSDP framework, with its gradual changes, has created a framework of rules and practices that must be followed and observed. It can be influenced and changed by both senior officials in the EU Member States and senior officials in the EU institutional framework. The CSDP framework consists of fragmented elements that bring together EU objectives, encourage EU Member States to think together, influence EU Member States' defence institutions and policies, influence defence policy-makers, and promote concerted and compatible action by EU Member States. In a way, through their involvement in the CSDP, EU Member States recognize the EU as a legitimate and credible actor in the military field. As the CSDP changes, so does the institutional cognitive script about it at the national level.

The EU has the principle of complementarity and synergy with NATO, and national security is the responsibility of each member state. The changes to the CSDP took place after the 2014 Russian aggression in Ukraine and the launch of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. There has been a gradual development and expansion of elements of the CSDP's practical capabilities.

The most widely known elements of EU capabilities are EU military missions and operations, and EU Battlegroups. The conduct and scale of EU military missions and operations have allowed the EU to develop and learn. This means taking into account the lessons learned and recommendations. The overall trend is related to the EU's need for military capabilities. Following the events of 2014, PESCO and the EDF gained momentum. These directions form thinking in the wider field of play. PESCO should be singled out, as it covers a wide range of military capability projects and can serve as a tool in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the CSDP. Issues such as the creation of a European army and a European Defence Union, the expansion of EU military capabilities and the French-led EI2 have also come to the fore.

At the national level, the defence sector is specific and relatively isolated from society. The leading institutions of the defence sector of the countries involved in the CSDP include its formal provisions in policy planning and policy documents, as well as in the regulatory framework, creating, thus, a formal aspect of the cognitive script. This is done to the extent that it is not contrary to national interests. The CFSP and the CSDP are independent policy areas. Decisions on CSDP matters are taken on the basis of a consensus principle. This is one of the most important aspects of the CSDP.

The institutional cognitive script is influenced by senior officials in the defence sector, who operate within a certain framework of behavior and practice. Norms, values, and practices, by repeating them, become an internalized script for actors in sociological institutionalism. The actors of the institution gradually internalize the norms and no longer focus on the rationale for action, but follow a cognitive script. For countries such as Latvia, a security strategy is a conditional international deal aimed at building and developing their international solidarity, as well as building trust in case some support is

needed in the future. In the institutional framework, the interaction between the leading officials of the institution and the institutions is based on a kind of practical thinking, where individuals act in accordance with the available institutional paradigms. The leading institution in the defence sector in Latvia is the Ministry of Defence. It develops and implements national defence policy. The transformation of the CSDP strategy from security to insecurity, as well as its normative analysis, the study of procedures and the institutional framework with its expression of the impractical capabilities, is the framework influencing the institutional cognitive script. It is also influenced by the external context on the development of CSDP.

In order to test the hypotheses and achieve the aim, a separate chapter examines the elements of the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script on CSDP: the formal aspect in Latvia's defence policy strategic documents, legal (regulatory), procedural and institutional framework, practical capability elements and the role of the decision makers of Latvia's defence sector. The analysis of the mentioned directions allows to identify the transformation of the cognitive script of Latvia's defence sector on CSDP.

3 Latvia's defence sector cognitive script on the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy

This chapter consists of the following subsections: 3.1 Transformation of the formal aspect of the cognitive script in the strategic framework of Latvia's defence policy; 3.1.1 Transforming the formal aspect of the cognitive script before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty; 3.1.2 Transforming the formal aspect of the cognitive script after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty; 3.2 Transforming the framework of the cognitive script: legal basis, procedures and institutional aspects; 3.2.1 The functional framework of the cognitive script framework and the organizational structure of the Latvia's defence sector; 3.2.2 Legal aspects and procedures of the cognitive script framework; 3.3 An aspect of the European Union's capabilities and response tools in the cognitive script; 3.3.1 The practical basis of the cognitive script: European Union military missions and operations, as well as European Union Battle groups; 3.3.2 Elements of the cognitive script after the Russian aggression in Ukraine and in the context of Covid-19: Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund; 3.4 The Role of Decision Makers in the Latvia's defence sector in the Transformation of the cognitive script; 3.4.1 The role of decision-makers of the Latvia's defence sector in the transformation of the cognitive script before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty; 3.4.2 The role of decision-makers of the Latvia's defence sector in the transformation of the cognitive script after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

The CSDP plays a complementary role in Latvia's defence policy. It is like a dogma that stems from policy planning and policy documents. The year 2009 marked the borderline and the rise of CSDP issues. This follows from Latvia's defence policy planning documents, regulatory framework, decisions made and practical involvement. In the period before Latvia's accession to

NATO and the EU, membership in these organizations has been a priority. After joining the EU, there is an impression that Latvia does not intend to use the new mechanisms in matters of security and defence. Aspects of CSDP are included minimally in Latvia's defence policy planning documents. Nevertheless, the concluding NSC includes a separate chapter on CSDP issues. This is due to the fact that the CSDP was only introduced in 2009, replacing the ESDP. The ESDP was in the early stage of development of CSDP and Latvia did not have sufficient resources, nor was the policy itself taken seriously enough for wider involvement. It was also not clear what Latvia's goals were. The effectiveness of the ESDP was also questioned.

With the gradual development of the CSDP, as influenced by the Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 and the launch of the procedure for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, the issues of the CSDP appear more visibly in the framework of Latvia's defence policy. The issue of military capabilities and the benefits of Latvia's involvement in various CSDP formats are important. Latvia became involved in EU military missions and operations before joining the EU. Latvia's representation in EU Battle groups has also been quite extensive. After 2014, PESCO and the EDF are the most important areas of EU capabilities in which Latvia is participating. Latvia is sufficiently involved in PESCO. In the field of PESCO, it should be emphasized that it can serve to overcome the Covid-19 pandemic and similar challenges. Presence and solidarity with partner countries, demonstrating their capabilities and gaining experience are also benefits. In matters of the CSDP in a broader sense, it shows that Latvia's defence policy is based on decisions made in the past and guided by the logic of appropriateness. The actions of senior officials are based on a certain cognitive script. Its gradual changes are taking place with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the achievement of a certain institutional maturity, as well as the role of the Minister of Defence A. Pabriks. The changes

that have taken place indicate a change in the way of thinking, as well as a certain institutional maturity. What is important in the cognitive script is not only the ability to act according to the path taken, but to achieve added value by making changes, among other things. These changes can also be a turning point for the institution. Within the institutional framework, it has been a gradual process that started with EU accession, but has gained momentum within the CSDP since its introduction. It is a way of gaining knowledge and experience as different circumstances change, leading to greater convergence.

It is a formalized process that is bureaucratic and resistant to change. The regulatory framework of Latvia's defence sector includes issues related to the CSDP to the extent necessary not to jeopardize the strategic direction of defence policy. The CSDP is limited in defence policy planning documents. In the field of CSDP, in areas in which most EU member states are involved and these directions do not pose a risk to NATO, Latvia is sufficiently involved (e.g., PESCO, EDF, EU military missions and operations, EU Battle groups). On the other hand, in matters related to the interests of certain EU powers, as well as posing risks to NATO, Latvia's position is stable (for example, the establishment of the European Army, European autonomy, the establishment of the European Defence Union and EI2). Membership in NATO is the basis of Latvia's defence policy. It is a kind of conditional border or the red line of the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script on the CSDP.

In the field of CSDP, decisions must be taken unanimously. This is the most important principle that must be observed by all member states, at the same time Latvia must be able to adapt to the interests of the leading EU countries, successfully maneuvering and not endangering Latvia's strategic direction in defence policy. In terms of the cognitive script, senior officials in the Latvia's defence sector respect the CSDP framework in both strategic and legal terms, while at the same time being sufficiently involved in CSDP

instruments. National regulations and decisions made in the past are also considered.

The general trend is like a wave that more or less has steadily led to integration, and by involvement in CSDP instruments the defence sector has adapted to the situation resulting from its commitment to the CSDP. The most important areas of involvement in the CSDP are EU military missions and operations, EU Battlegroups, PESCO and the EDF. Challenges considered in decision-making include resources, funding, strengthening national capabilities, the risk of duplication of NATO functions, the ambitions and willingness of some EU powers to take military control in Europe, any past negative experiences with procurement cooperation or EU military operations and missions.

In terms of the cognitive script, what matters is the length of time that senior officials in the defence sector have been in office and what their previous experience has been, as it is a competence, a vision of things more broadly, seeing connections. When seeing the interconnections, it is important to be able not only to take action on the trail, but also to achieve added value by making changes. Change can also be a turning point for an institution. In the Latvia's defence sector, some officials have slipped downstream, not promoting wider involvement in the CSDP, but guided by a cognitive script and past decisions. At the same time, a rational choice can be seen in this aspect, as it also means stability and resilience in line with the prevailing trends.

Conclusion

In order to achieve the aim of this work and to test the hypotheses, an aspect of the cognitive script of sociological institutionalism was chosen from the different trends of the new institutionalism, which for the purposes of a comprehensive analysis was assessed in conjunction with the framework of appropriate action. In the study of the development of the new institutionalism and the essential aspects of the most important trends, the theoretical aspects of sociological institutionalism were distinguished from the other trends of the new institutionalism. At the same time, the importance and transformation of institutional research, as well as the most important aspects of the new institutionalism, were shown. The aspect of the cognitive script of sociological institutionalism distinguishes it from other types of new institutionalism. At the same time, sociological institutionalism in terms of the cognitive script cannot be completely isolated and separated from historical and rational choice institutionalism.

In terms of the cognitive script, actors consider the past decisions, and their actions in the form of inaction can be a rational choice. It is a kind of comfortable position that has its advantages in terms of durability and stability. Thus, calculating the benefit of certain decisions can also lead to inaction and following the usual script. Past decisions made within the institution, as well as the framework of appropriate action in terms of the cognitive script, not only affect the actors of the institution – by restricting them, but also include them in a certain framework, thus influencing their choices and discretion in decision-making.

A cognitive script is an action with a related sequence that describes frequently experienced events, resulting in expectations, as well as behaviours in everyday situations. An internalized template is created for a possible sequence of actions (activity) for the actors involved. A script is an instruction

for a set of steps. The script organizes, structures and transforms the meaning of socio-cultural knowledge gained through experience, interaction and observation. They form part of an overall sequential structure, traversing a context, situation or event that can be reversed in the future. The script is acquired through participation and observation throughout life, it is activated through the recognition of similarities and previous experiences. Over time, institutions develop a certain cognitive script that is identifiable and different for each institution. It is also variable.

During the research of the CSDP, the elements of Latvia's cognitive script on CSDP were highlighted in this work. The study synthesizes the cognitive script of sociological institutionalism with the CSDP, thus identifying Latvia's defence sector cognitive script on the CSDP. CSDP research falls into the field of research on European defence policy and Latvia's defence policy. The study is considered to be a contribution to defence policy research. Analyzing the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script, several conclusions have been drawn about its elements. CSDP Latvia's defence policy is given a secondary or complementary role. The CSDP aspects are included in the regulatory framework for the security and defence sector as needed. This is done as much as needed, that is, to the extent that it does not jeopardize the strategic direction of defence policy, meaning the membership in NATO. At the same time, the CSDP aspect is covered in defence policy planning documents in a limited way. Involvement in the CSDP has changed from skeptical to more tolerant and flexible, while remaining cautious. Latvia is involved in all EU policies. With regard to the CSDP, Latvia must also fulfill its commitments and Latvia is participating in it. Involvement in CSDP for Latvia means solidarity with partners, presence together with partners in different regions, participation in decision-making, receiving and providing security and defence guarantees, as well as gaining experience at the strategic, operational or tactical level.

Latvia's MoD naturally and synergistically engages in CSDP mechanisms that provide practical benefits. Latvia's cognitive script on CSDP can be described as skeptical and inflexible in its early stages of development. It also covers the period when the ESDP had not yet become the CSDP. It has shifted to a more flexible and tolerant approach, while remaining cautious. Latvia's involvement takes place in those CSDP mechanisms where practical benefits are seen. The overall trend has more or less led towards integration. During the study of the transformation of the cognitive script of Latvia's defence sector on CSDP, three hypotheses were tested. When researching the cognitive script of the Latvia's defence sector, it has been identified that the highest officials are guided by the cognitive script and based on the logic of appropriateness. At the same time, building on past decisions and continuing the course on CSDP issues is a rational choice.

The Latvia's defence sector cognitive script on CSDP is formalized, it is resistant to change. In the field of CSDP, in the directions in which the majority of EU member states are involved, and these directions do not pose risks to NATO, Latvia is sufficiently involved (e.g., PESCO, EDF, EU military missions and operations, EU battle groups). On the other hand, in matters related to the interests of certain EU powers and posing risks to NATO, Latvia's position is stable (for example, the establishment of the European Army, European strategic autonomy, the establishment of the European Defence Union and EI2). It is also the relative border or red line of the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script on the CSDP.

The study put forward three hypotheses. The first hypothesis – the convergence of the institutional cognitive script of the Latvia's defence sector with the CSDP began after the Lisbon Treaty had come into force – was partially confirmed. The CSDP was introduced in 2009 to replace the ESDP. In support of the Lisbon Treaty, Latvia joined all its policies, including the CSDP.

The momentum on the CSDP issue was after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, but at the same time the convergence of the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script with the CSDP is inseparable from the process of Latvia's integration into the EU. Latvia joined the EU in 2004 and prior to CSDP there was the ESDP. When Latvia joined the EU, it was clear that the security and defence aspect was also important within the EU. What was included in the policy planning documents before the implementation of the CSDP gave the impression that Latvia did not plan to use the new opportunities. Latvia did not have sufficient resources in this direction, and the policy itself was not taken seriously, and it was not clear what Latvia wanted from the EU in terms of defence. At the same time, Latvia became involved in the first EU military mission and operation, as well as in the EU security and defence mechanisms before joining the EU. At that time, the EU's security and defence policy was still in its infancy (the CSDP was not yet in place). In this way, the initial basis for the development of a common cognitive guideline was laid, also developing appropriate institutional practices. This is more evident in Latvia's involvement in the CSDP in the later period. Although Latvia's involvement was limited, it took place before the implementation of the CSDP. The convergence of Latvia's cognitive script with the CSDP took place after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, as the CSDP was introduced at that time. However, given that Latvia's involvement in the ESDP, which is a continuation of the CSDP, took place upon accession to the EU, the hypothesis was partially confirmed. The impact of past decisions on the period when the CSDP was implemented is also visible. Involvement in the ESDP has taken place on its own, transforming it into the CSDP. The two stages are inseparable.

The second hypothesis – the highest officials of the Ministry of Defence have played the decisive role in the convergence of the cognitive scripts of the Latvia's defence sector with the CSDP – was confirmed. During the analyzed

period, each of the highest officials has acted within a certain framework of rules and practices, implementing the tasks and goals set by the MoD. They operate within the framework of appropriate action and are guided by past decisions. In EU defence matters, a solid and consistent position on CSDP has been ensured. It has not changed, as the CSDP has a secondary role in Latvia's defence policy. In Latvian practice, there have been cases when the position of minister is held by persons who are unable to fully operate in the relevant sector. This leads to superficial participation without actually affecting the processes.

In the period leading up to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the views of Latvia's top officials on the military aspect of the EU were more skeptical, and the CSDP itself had not yet been established. The activities of senior officials who are less involved in CSDP matters can be described as a successful integration into the institutional bureaucratic network of the Ministry of Defence, without any active action or attempts to get the most out of the EU's defence. Thus, it is determined by the already prevailing or existing attitude towards and involvement in the CSDP. In a way, it is a rational choice, as well as a guide to a certain cognitive script. It has not been changed and has changed according to the existing settings. It is also characterized by the extent of involvement, as the ministry apparatus is looking for ways to get involved and to what extent, in line with the prevailing philosophy. On the other hand, when making decisions, senior officials can change the course they have already started and decide on a wider involvement, thus also influencing the cognitive script.

Although the trend towards the CSDP is broadly stable, the role of some senior officials has played a significant role in changing the cognitive script of the Latvia's defence sector and converging with the CSDP. The indicator is not only the information obtained on the decisions made by certain senior officials,

their thinking about the institution's activities and ability to adapt to the changing environment, but also the analysis of the content of NSC, NDC and public accounts of MoD, as well as statistics on CSDP involvement and contributions.

The period of change in the convergence of cognitive script must be linked to the period after 2010, when the Minister of Defence was A. Pabriks, when it became more purposeful and meaningful, also benefiting more from participation in CSDP mechanisms. Until then, there was no clear framework for what really needed to be done in the direction of the EU. Development is reflected in a more real and broader involvement in CSDP instruments, without changing the main settings of Latvia's membership in NATO, Latvia's position has gradually become more flexible and accommodating with regard to EU action in the defence area. At the same time, it is an adaptation to the situation. The ability of senior officials to break inertia is a positive trend, but most often senior officials follow the traditional direction of the civil service apparatus in order to maintain the policy already under way.

After 2010, the trend for the CSDP can be described as stable and more flexible, as well as in line with the principle of inertia. When making even small changes to the CSDP, it must be assessed in the context of NATO, as it is a priority in Latvia's defence policy. The changes to the CSDP that have affected senior officials are nuanced and not easy to see, as they pose a risk. Latvia's involvement in PESCO shows a more flexible view of the CSDP. At first, the view of PESCO was cautious, but it gradually changed. Issues of wider involvement in the CSDP are being analyzed and carefully assessed by senior officials. The key role of senior officials has manifested in both stability and the continuation of the chosen course, as well as in broader involvement in line with CSDP developments. Senior officials have also expressed a clear message about the borders that are not acceptable to Latvia in the development

of the CSDP, especially the direction towards the establishment of a European army or a European Defence Union. As the cognitive script transforms into the CSDP, Latvia's senior defence officials and the institution as a whole have successfully maneuvered between NATO as the primary guarantor of Latvia's defence, the ambitious ideas of certain EU powers and the desire to be a defence leader in the EU and the benefits of the CSDP. There are various benefits to participating in CSDP mechanisms, regardless of extent. It is the presence, cooperation with partners, it is solidarity with receiving security guarantees, providing security and protection guarantees, common experience, participation in the decision-making process.

The third hypothesis – the convergence of the institutional cognitive script of Latvia's defence sector with the CSDP was promoted by the maturity of thinking of the MoD and Russia's military aggression in Ukraine – was also confirmed. There has been a gradual increase in interaction with the CSDP. Latvia did not have enough experience in joining NATO and EU security and defence mechanisms, it developed gradually. It took some time to reach institutional maturity. The approximate period in the case of Latvia is ten years since joining the EU. As part of the EU's security and defence architecture, building on the experience gained and with the support of partner countries Latvia started development of its own products. This has gradually built the status of Latvia, as it is a full-fledged player alongside the great powers, it has clear national needs and shares its expertise and experience with other countries. There is no longer any fundamental discussion about membership, and the arguments “completely against” have lost their relevance.

In terms of the maturity of the way of thinking, one of the challenges has been in administrative thinking. The quality, competence and knowledge of both ministers and officials have changed. Thus, by influencing the institutional cognitive script, the convergence of Latvia's defence sector with the CSDP has

been promoted. Confidence in the CSDP has been affected in various ways. The bottleneck is the excessive bureaucracy in the EU institutions and inability to take clear decisions, the negative experience of cooperating with some EU Member States, and the overpriced procurements within EU.

Within the institutional framework of Latvia's defence sector, an understanding of the CSDP has gradually developed. All ministers have also maintained pragmatic and limited involvement in the CSDP. It is also an adjustment to trends that have also been affected by external circumstances in the framework of the CSDP. The most important examples in the context of Russia's aggression in Ukraine are the intensification of discussions on the CSDP, the adoption of the EU's Global Strategy, the launch of PESCO and the creation of the EDF. Both the leading officials of the Latvia's defence sector and the institution as a whole are adapting to the development of the CSDP. This facilitated further integration towards the CSDP. At the same time, they are changes in the minds due to external events. It is also a conditional signal of unity, commitment and readiness, as well as a response. Russia's aggression in Ukraine, coupled with the maturity of the cognitive script, contributed to Latvia's convergence with the CSDP. An example of this is the wider inclusion of CSDP aspects in strategic documents. In this way, Latvian institutions communicate with cooperation partners here in Latvia and abroad. In this way, a fundamental basis is laid and it simply cannot be abandoned.

This study serves as a basis for exploring other aspects of the Latvia's defence sector cognitive script on the CSDP, or for their isolation and in-depth research. The analysis carried out at the same time allows it to be applied to the study of cognitive script in other sectors as well.

Publications

The results of the dissertation have been published in the following scientific publications:

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The list of literature of the dissertation includes 307 items of information resources. This list includes the sources and literature items mentioned in the summary of the dissertation. **The full bibliography can be found in the dissertation.**

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