

## PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY III

### Summary

*Dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Department of Humanities of Rīga Stradiņš University*

This third volume is identical to the previous ones in its structural form, but conceptually different in its attempt to answer the fundamental question of philosophical anthropology: what is man? A question that is difficult to answer in general, and even more difficult to answer in a single volume – however, the authors dare to try, because their desire to find an answer, or at least to come close to it, is too great. The process of looking for an answer is also cognitively exciting and stimulating, even if there is no hope for a positive result. In their search for an answer to this question, the authors have taken considered not only the multidisciplinary approach but also the most important thinkers and movements, specificity of the anthropological perspective in the context of Western culture. The answer to this question is also sought within a limited time period – from the Enlightenment to the present day.

**Elīna Graudiņa** in her article “The Natural State of Human According to Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau” examines the views and visions of Enlightenment thinkers on the position of an individual and society in relation to the State, society and each other. Hobbes describes the natural human condition as a selfish desire for self-preservation, characterised by a spirit of competition, distrust and fear. It is the development of “natural law” according to which a man is free to do whatever they like, and “the state of war of all against all” begins. In his natural state, man has both external freedom of action and internal freedom of will, and therefore a natural right to everything. A state where duties and rights are based on contract is a system in which the individual’s selfishness is overridden by his duty to himself, to his neighbour and to the state at large.

John Locke argues that there is no innate knowledge in the individual and that man is born as a “blank slate”. He believed that an individual’s personality, knowledge and character are formed as a result of the influences of the world around him. All human beings are free, equal and independent by nature.

Thomas Hobbes’s social contract theory was further developed and simultaneously criticized by Jean Jacques Rousseau. He describes transition from the state of nature to the state of citizenship. This transition brings about a remarkable change in man, replacing instinct with justice in their behaviour, giving their

actions a moral meaning. What man loses with the social contract is their natural freedom, limited only by the forces of an individual. It must be distinguished from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will and property. Rousseau defends the thesis that man is good by nature and only society corrupts them morally. The philosopher cites a faulty education as one of the reasons for this, and therefore calls for an immediate reform of pedagogy, replacing traditional methods of education with “natural education”. The reform in question is based on precise knowledge of the nature of the child.

Several centuries have passed since Hobbes’s conclusions on the selfishness of human nature, but this does not change the fact that the “natural state” of man has not really changed, emphasises Elīna Graudiņa.

In her article “Søren Kierkegaard’s Anthropology”, **Velga Vēvere** first focuses on Kierkegaard’s views on communication, which is the most essential part of human existence. The philosopher writes about the three distinctions between direct and indirect communication in relation to the four basic elements of communication: the object of communication, the communicator, the receiver of information and the communication process itself. Since objective knowledge does not depend on personal characteristics, ethical positions or religious beliefs of the people involved, it is significant that the relationship between the communicator and the receiver is only possible in an indirect form. So, Kierkegaard asks what it means to be human. What does it mean to be human in a certain existential situation? Is an authentic self at all possible? Can the existent individual be aware of their authenticity? His focus is on the subjectively existent individual, whose goal is self-understanding and the emergence of an authentic self. Kierkegaard speaks of the three stages of life: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. One of the basic postulates of Kierkegaard’s anthropology is that human identity is a synthesis of different elements: actuality, freedom and possibility.

Category of existence is central to the discourse of Kierkegaard’s anthropology. The concept of existence and its variations appear in more than 20 of Kierkegaard’s works in different contexts and in different variations (in relation to being and its becoming, communication, stages of existence). Velga Vēvere points out that in Danish two terms are used, namely existence and actuality – a special kind of being in the world. This dual use of the term reflects Kierkegaard’s understanding of existence. An individual’s existence is their existential status, which does not depend on their desire or activity. However, for Kierkegaard, it is the understanding of existence as an actuality that presupposes participation (activity) of an individual that is more significant. Passivity or activity, indulgence or action, static state or becoming are indicators that allow us to distinguish between the two understandings of existence. To exist usually means only that by entering into existence the individual is in it and simultaneously is in the process of becoming.

The Danish thinker takes up a special place in the anthropological discourse of the 19<sup>th</sup> century with his distinction between philosophical and theological anthropology; his philosophical approach is concerned with human experience and conscious action, while the theological view is based on the idea of revelation. Kierkegaard formulates his ethically religious imperative by saying that love of the other presupposes that society is a collection of independent individuals as opposed to a crowd or impersonal public.

In their article “Person, Human Being and Subjectivity in Phenomenology”, **Māra Grīnfelde and Uldis Vēgners** look at three types of human attitudes of consciousness through the prism of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. First, the authors describe the concept of attitude itself. Attitudes express a person’s relationship to objects in the broadest sense, whether they be things, living beings, events, abstract ideas, or ultimately the person himself and their feelings, emotions and attitudes. Even when people say they are indifferent (they have no attitude), they do have an attitude, i.e., neutral attitude. In Husserl’s philosophy, however, attitude is not a particular approach to a particular object, but a comprehensive point of view of consciousness, perspective or stance towards objects in general. Husserl defines attitude in general terms as a habitually determined style of life of the will, with its predetermined will-directions and interests, with destinations, cultural achievements, the overall style of which is thus determined. The authors describe the three characteristic types of attitude in greater detail, according to Husserl’s phenomenology: personalistic, naturalistic and phenomenological.

The personalistic attitude is the “the self as a person”, which Husserl also calls the naturalistic attitude. The word “natural” is not meant here as the one characterising or belonging to physical nature, but as opposed to that artificially created and maintained. Man does not have to do anything to adopt a personalistic attitude, because he finds himself in it from the beginning and in the very essence. The naturalistic attitude is “Me as a representative of the species” – man can experience themselves not only as an embodied person but also as a specific living nature, a specific specie that experiences itself and other living organisms as natural objects, so that man can be studied by the methods of natural science. Unlike the personalistic attitude, which is characterised by motivational relations, the naturalistic attitude operates in causal, i.e., causal, relations.

Phenomenological attitude “the self as a transcendental subjectivity” – as is the case with the naturalistic attitude, the phenomenological or transcendental attitude is artificial; one does not tend to live it as a person in everyday life, but as the result of a special intellectual effort which, in order to persist in it, requires practising and habit-forming.

The authors conclude that transcendental subjectivity is meaningful because it makes everything experienced mean something to us. Whereas the self in

the personalistic and naturalistic attitudes can die and is therefore mortal, the transcendental self does not die because it is not a living being but rather a condition of experience of living beings. The transcendental self can only begin and end.

**Laura Bitiniece** explores “Human Beings and Technological Thinking: Heidegger’s Perspective”. In the course of this article, she focuses on two themes: existence and interrogation of the self, looking at the way humans are (analysing what Heidegger calls existentials, i.e., authenticity, inauthenticity and being-toward-death), and the opposition between freedom and control, or what Heidegger calls technique. The notion of technique is linked to the human need to exploit and subjugate nature, while simultaneously subjugating one’s own freedom. The article concludes with Heidegger’s ideas on how to overcome technical thinking.

Heidegger distinguishes between two types of definitions: technique is a means to an end (instrumental definition) and technique is a human activity (anthropological definition). Heidegger proposes to view the nature of technology not only through instrumental and anthropological prisms, but to recognise that technology today is becoming the only environment for man, the environment of the unfolding of being, when everything – self, nature, the world – is seen only through technological perception, technological (un)thinking.

Modern technology demands that we reduce everything to resources, which are just waiting to be incorporated into a technological system. What can we do? Is it possible to free ourselves from the technical setting in order, as Heidegger says, to access more original ways of discovery, more original truth? This question is in line with his question about authentic existence in the “Being and Time” stage. Heidegger generally places his hope in art, which can change us, as an alternative way of discovering the world; a way that is more original and closer to human existence. Art is to be thought as the opposite of the tendency to “technologise”, produce and use. Art shows that the world is not just a petrol station.

Heidegger stresses that liberation from technique is to be found in the discovery that technique is a mode of discovery. It is as if he were urging us to stop, to suspend our technical, exploitative and applied thinking; to be silent in relation to nature. Not to try and be intrusive. First the silence of thinking, and then to think and be free, in philosophy and art. Just like taking a step back in humanity’s race towards absolute technologisation. Not everything can be done forwards.

In her article “The Human Being and French Philosophical Anthropology between Paul Ricoeur and Michel Foucault”, **Māra Rubene** not only focuses on the ideas of the best-known philosophers, but also provides a broader insight into the 20<sup>th</sup> century tradition of philosophical anthropology, including Latvia. The author first identifies the period of the 1920s and 1930s, when the concept of philosophical anthropology took on a modern shape, coming to the fore at the intersection of philosophical debates, explaining human life, the human world, and human

nature. In the 1960s and 1970s, debates about man were particularly heated, seeking answers to the questions: what happened? Why did it happen? How could it have happened? These questions were still present after the Second World War. The third period in the development of French philosophical anthropology dates back to the first decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which, according to scholars, is characterised by a “recovery of courage”, when “after the death of man, his disappearance or his end”, the “category of anthropology” is once again addressed. Philosophical anthropology is understood in a wide range of terms, from the “doctrine of human nature” and transdisciplinary study of human plurality in what is termed historical anthropology, to collective designation of individual philosophical fields, while at the same time “resisting a single definition”. Philosophical anthropology focuses on the question of the possibilities of man and the human, social and natural sciences, which also means answering questions about the foundations and interrelationships of these sciences. Paul Ricoeur asks rhetorically: why do I pose the human problem as a milieu problem? Ricoeur doubts that the concept of finitude, which has received so much attention, could be promoted as central to philosophical anthropology; instead, he proposes to speak of a triad, namely finitude-infinity and mediation. In Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology, the human desire to be, finitude, is turned towards the miracle of birth, the beginning of an ever-new life; towards the continuation of life rather than existence towards death.

Māra Rubene also looks at Michel Foucault’s anthropological insights, stressing that already in one of Foucault’s first philosophical texts, preserved for the course “Human Cognition and Transcendental Reflection” at the University of Lille in 1952, Foucault addressed the anthropological theme in the 19<sup>th</sup> century works by Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Dilthey and Nietzsche. Foucault argues that in philosophical anthropology the fourth question “What is man?” does not mean an answer to the question “What is the truth of human existence”, but rather “How can human beings respond to truth”. Philosophy must return to the question already posed by the ancient Greek philosophers of what is a good life and must build on those forces which ensure our ability and power to resist its assimilation to a thing, its transformation into a mechanism. Foucault’s insights on the art of life and the aesthetics of existence must be seen precisely in this light.

**Vija Šīle** explores “The Concept of Modern Human Beings in the View of Erich Fromm: Destructiveness”, thus reflecting only on the one side of human duality (Mairita Satika in her follow-up article in this collection looks at another aspect, namely love). By studying man from the individual, psychological and social perspectives, Erich Fromm in fact explores duality of human nature, revealing the manifold manifestations of its contradictory nature. Fromm asks the question, seemingly rhetorically: do people have a “human nature”, does such a phenomenon even exist? His answer to this self-imposed question is

essentialist, because it is based on the conviction that the ideas of humanism are rooted in the belief that all human beings have a human nature. Fromm's research also focuses on the question of what the driving forces of human beings are. Man's duality is expressed in his biosocial nature – the way he relates to both nature and society.

Fromm focuses on the relationship between the innate and the acquired, seeking to answer the question of how social character is formed and what is inherent in the human personality. Social character is what, in order for society to function normally, must develop in its members the desire to do what is necessary for a wider society. Character is thus a specifically human phenomenon, which Fromm examines from two angles: as individual character and as social character. Character is a relatively fixed form of conducting human energy in the processes of assimilation and socialisation. For man, it can be seen as a substitute for instinct, since they can organise their life according to their character, thus balancing their internal and external situation, value system, preferences, etc.

According to Fromm, the character consists of two aspects: the dynamic concept of character and the non-productive personality type. In describing the non-productive personality type in detail, Fromm identifies four characteristics: receptive, exploitative, hoarding, and marketing, which are typical of people in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, with the exception of the marketing type, which only applies to the present day. Since character is formed through a process of socialisation, it is natural to ask what the role of social conditions in the formation of character is. Not only in the past but also in the present, man becomes cruel and destructive because they lack conditions necessary for their development.

Fromm discusses three phenomena which, in his view, are the worst and most dangerous forms of human tendency: necrophilia, malignant narcissism and incestuous symbiosis. Together, they form the “syndrome of decay”, which urges man to destroy for destruction's sake and to hate for hatred's sake.

It is from the duality of human nature that Fromm's view of man as a being who must create himself – develop their innate gifts (potential) within the limits of what society can provide – emerges. But it is up to an individual to determine to what extent these possibilities are used. If the individual is unable to fulfil themselves completely, or cannot do so because of certain circumstances (alienation), they become destructive.

**Mairita Satika** continues her discussion of Fromm by focusing on the theme of love in her article “The Concept of Modern Human Beings in the View of Erich Fromm: Love”. She looks at Fromm's view of the duality of human nature, focusing on the solutions that the author proposes, which would also be useful for the modern man: how to recognise, develop and experience productive character orientations, how to overcome difference and achieve unity. The article describes

forms of love and pseudo-love, it also discusses Fromm's practice of the art of love in comparison with mindfulness practices.

Fromm is convinced that love is an attitude, an orientation of character, the conscious living of which makes it possible to experience unity and connection with oneself, with the object of love, and simultaneously with the world as a whole. He describes the most common forms of love as: maternal, fraternal and erotic love. In order to grasp the variety of possible models of child-parent relationships, Fromm also discusses forms of neurotic love that have a negative impact on a child's personality development and, consequently, on their future relationships, such as a boy's attachment to his mother in a manner that is inappropriate for his age or an exaggerated attachment to his father. Erotic love can also be inadequate – impulsive indulgence in experience of “falling in love”, superficiality of the relationship, deliberate unwillingness to get to know the partner, which inevitably contributes to transience of the experience. Elmo-love and sentimental love are forms of pseudo-love rooted in immature personality's perception of the world. Fromm sees God's love as a special form of love.

Beyond the pleasant states that mindfulness practice can foster, the most valuable benefit is the transformed character qualities that have a significant and beneficial impact on our daily lives – the relationship with ourselves and others. Spontaneous realisation of one's true self enables one to experience oneness with the world, which is expressed in oneness with other people, with nature and also with oneself. Love and work, on the other hand, are an essential part of spontaneity. Mature love, which strives for unity without losing the individuality of the parties involved, and work as a creative process through which unity is experienced.

In his article “The Modern Human Being and the Archetypes”, **Vents Silis** discusses the question of human nature in relation to the concept of the archetype, which occupies a central place in the analytical psychology of Carl Gustav Jung. Jung's answer to the question “What is man?” includes an explanation of the intrapsychic structure, relationships between people at the private and social levels, and the path of personal self-development, i.e., the process of individuation. The human psyche is seen by Jung as a complex system charged with libidinal energy, where there is a constant interaction between different pairs of opposing elements: conscious and unconscious, rational and irrational, masculine and feminine, etc. Nevertheless, according to the principle of equivalence introduced by Jung, the libido that has been taken away from one aspect of personality usually reappears somewhere else. The principle of enantiodromia, on the other hand, means that any one of the elements will in time turn into its opposite, e.g., passionate love may eventually turn into deep hatred. The principle of opposites is found in all elements of Jung's theory.

Jung's anthropology is based on a fundamental distinction between two main levels of the psyche: the conscious and the unconscious, each of which divides

into two further levels, the personal and the collective. The life of the psyche is one of equilibrium, i.e., the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious can be described as mutually compensatory: if a conscious idea or tendency becomes too dominant, the unconscious tends to compensate with an unconscious tendency. Thus, the unconscious compensates for the one-sidedness of the conscious by emphasising those aspects of the whole psyche that the conscious has neglected – in essence it is a mechanism similar to homeostasis.

Jung's theory of archetypes is critically examined. The author asks whether the notion of innate, universal structures of the psyche are still valid. Jung himself speaks of archetypes as empirical (experientially verified) facts, but this understanding fails the current understanding of scientific psychology. Vents Sīlis points out that one might reasonably doubt whether archetypes, as forms of perception and organisation of empirical experience, are really independent of physical and social environment. The findings of modern cognitive science are applicable to Jung's theory of archetypes through the concept of emergence: archetypes are fundamental patterns, initially unfilled with content, which are revealed in interaction with empirical experience, which fills them with actual content.

Since the Self is the fullest expression of individuality, the psyche's movement towards its Self as the archetype of inner core and orderliness is the ultimate goal of psychological development. Countless studies by modern anthropologists show that even in the most basic human traits and behaviours (e.g., child-rearing) there are not only similarities but also radical differences between different cultures, so it is not possible to speak only of universal traits. This argument must certainly be considered, emphasises Sīlis, when modernising Jung's theory.

**Pēteris Plakans** has taken up the theme of "Christian Values for the Modern Human". The author approaches this topic from a relatively new perspective – anthropology of Christianity, which explores how the role of religion has changed in today's globalised world. The proportion of the population practising a Christian lifestyle is decreasing in the Western world. Religiously conservative Christians and religiously liberal Christians see different solutions to the changes in religiosity. Religiously conservative Christians want to reform the Church to meet biblical standards and rid themselves of the sinful vices of modern society, while religious liberals want to acknowledge social realities and make Christianity accessible to all. Religious liberals want to change existing religious beliefs, to abandon religious dogmas that prevent certain groups in the society from being recognised in religious organisations. Christian values, although retained by many as a definite denominational affiliation, are increasingly being embraced in spiritual practices that are associated not only with different branches of Christianity but also with different religions. Secularisation means not only reducing public support for Christianity but also making Christianity more acceptable because it is no longer so radical. One of the important objects



of the study in the anthropology of Christianity is schisms, which are the most frequent among Protestants.

In the early 1980s, “family values” came to mean opposition to atheism in schools, rising crime levels, spiritual decay, unbiblical social vices such as drug addiction, abortion, pornography, etc. For Americans, “family values” have come to be seen as almost identical to “religious”. Family value advocates promote their position as Christian conservatives and religious people. The issue of family values is most often understood as the support of traditional marriage.

Religious liberal ideas imply recognition of social reality that the traditional marriage model is no longer the only form of cohabitation and therefore, according to the principle of Christian love and social justice, it is necessary to support and improve the living conditions of same-sex couples, formerly discriminated groups in society. Christian love requires promoting the quality of life of transgender people, creating the possibility of conceiving offspring in various ways, for example, through surrogacy.

Religious liberals with Christian values, same as religious conservatives, recognise their importance as the basis of Western civilisation, also being aware of the issues of equality and social justice in these values. The spirituality of society is more important than individual religiosity, and that calls for common solutions to social problems.

In the first article of this volume, **Elina Graudiņa** examined the “natural state” of human in the works of three Enlightenment thinkers: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Further research on the topic has led to the insights summarised in the new text entitled “The Natural Condition of Human Today”. The link between Enlightenment ideas and modernity begins with Kant’s anthropology. In this section Graudiņa focuses on the theme of values and its correlation with the concept of freedom, education, development of democracy and civil society. In this context, Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism is relevant, which leads to conclusion that in totalitarian regimes human right to life is devalued to its lowest point. Crowd thinking is the key: the masses of people have reached a stage where they can believe in everything and nothing at the same time, they can think that everything is possible and nothing is true.

The author discusses Habermas’s ideas in more detail, since the theoretical framework he developed is dedicated to discovering possibilities of reason, emancipation and rational-critical communication hidden in modern institutions and in man’s capacity to become aware of and pursue rational interests. In further development of Arendt’s thesis of power as a collectively constructed phenomenon, Habermas points out that political power derives from communicative power, which is generated in the public sphere between members of civil society. It is defined as the result of free interaction in the public sphere, where important policy issues are discussed, new ideas are generated, socially significant problems

are solved and development of the country is thereby promoted. Habermas stresses that democracy is not inherently rooted in civil society or individual autonomy but in communicative relations, as these foster both mutual harmony and reasoned discourse. Consequently, education systems in democracies must be able to provide full understanding of the meaning and basic principles of democracy.

Elīna Graudiņa discusses Habermas's theory of communicative rationality in light of current problems. Namely, as the amount of information increases, so does misinformation that affects individuals and civil society, which is so important for democracy. Nowadays, every individual, whether in office or not, is able to address the public, not only by expressing their opinion, but also by influencing it. The threat to an individual is that there is a growing disbelief in facts, in science, in reasonableness, and a growing tension in society which could lead to the "state of war of all against all" as referred to by Thomas Hobbes. Communities of supporters of certain ideas are formed in the vast information space, which, without verifying veracity of the information, end up denying the role of public institutions. The author quotes Timothy Snyder, who argues that the individual begins to succumb to tyranny the moment he fails to notice the difference between what he wants to hear and what is actually the case.

Against the background of the problems of the present, Kant's insights, discussed at the beginning of the article, on the nature of man, which allows a free choice of the path of moral life – one can choose good or evil – are particularly relevant. Actions are not necessarily contrary to the law, but the mindset of their subject can be corrupted, and that subject can therefore be considered evil.

**Dina Bite** focuses on sociological aspect of looking at people. Accordingly, in her article "The Human Being from a Sociological Perspective", she gives an insight into the most important sociological paradigms, emphasising their relation to interpretation of human nature. The presentation of the topic uses classical division of sociological theories into macro and micro levels in chronological order, with the aim of highlighting their different perspectives on human nature. Dina Bite first discusses the definition of man in sociology, considering that the main focus of sociology is the interaction between man and the surrounding society, which implies an endless debate on the question "who came first – society or man?"

In the study of man, the term *homo sociologicus* is used to explain man's place in the social structure or cultural, economic and political context that determines their consciousness and way of life. The term *homo sociologicus* was first used by the German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf to emphasise the influence of morals and values on an individual's choices. The individual, although subject to set expectations, norms and sanctions, can nevertheless vary their performance in role fulfilment. The author emphasises that early sociological paradigms focused on a macro-level approach to the analysis of society, identifying the needs of society as a whole and the most important social structures in society, while later theoretical approaches

emphasised the influence of the individual in shaping social reality and sought to find a compromise between a strong macro and micro-level approach. Man, in the social theoretical sense, is a complex product of various internal impulses and external environmental factors. Human nature is characterised by biological and psychological traits, as well as by economic, political and cultural regimes of a given society. The task of sociologists would therefore be to look for commonalities and differences in combinations of the above-mentioned characteristics.

Theories of collectivism are synonymous with macro, structuralist and objectivist theories (e.g., structural functionalism). In contrast to the macro approach, the so-called individualist theories are emphasised. In their interpretation, social reality is the result of actions and interactions of individuals and groups. In this case, autonomy and value of an individual is relatively high, since it is up to individuals to determine what meanings will be assigned to certain objects and what consequences this will have. Theories of individualism include the so-called subjectivist, micro, elemental theories (e.g., symbolic interactionism, phenomenology). Dina Bite points out that sociology does not consider an individual in isolation from the surrounding social environment, so the most important difference between the theoretical perspectives that explain interaction between an individual and the environment is the extent to which the individual is able to influence the environment. In a sociological perspective, issues of power, conflict and inequality are always present for the full expression or realisation of human nature.

Macro-level theories emphasise dependence of the expression of human nature on historically established forms of social organisation, which vary from time to time and from society to society. They see an individual as a socially and culturally organised being, willingly or unwillingly subject to the influence of society – in the range between instinctive and social human behaviour, macro-level theories represent social, economic, political, and cultural determinism.

Microsociological theories, on the other hand, offer analysis of society in terms of individual experience and action. Even from an individual level, social structures are comparatively active in influencing beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. Sociological theories describe human nature not only as a duality but as the result of interaction of multiple factors. Contribution of sociological perspective to the study of human nature is related to analysis of interaction and relationship between an individual and society. The author stresses that the challenge and opportunity of contemporary sociology is to develop an integrated and interdisciplinary view of the various aspects of human nature, taking into account diversity and variability of social life.