Cyber deterrence by punishment and denial: approaches of the Unites States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany
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Date
2021
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Rīgas Stradiņa universitāte
Rīga Stradiņš University
Rīga Stradiņš University
Abstract
This master’s thesis aims to explore the cyber deterrence approaches of punishment and denial, focusing on credibility and effectiveness through the examples of NATO’s leading cyber powers: United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany and how they have responded to significant cyber-attacks from external actors. For this reason, the title of the master’s thesis is as follows: ‘Cyber deterrence by punishment and denial: approaches of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany’.
The objective of the study is to analyse the credibility and effectiveness of the cyber deterrence approaches of punishment and denial adopted by the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. A research hypothesis has been established in order to compare the two cyber deterrence strategies and to identify the reasons for each state’s motivation for adopting both or either of the strategies. The hypothesis of the research is that the combined cyber deterrence of punishment and denial adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom provide greater credibility and effectiveness than deterrence by denial, adopted by France and Germany and. Likewise, five research tasks have been established in order to explore the development of deterrence theory, its relation and applicability to the cyber domain and how the concepts of cyber deterrence by punishment and denial have been applied by the four states in order to safeguard their cyber domains. In addition, the tasks set for the study looks at the frequency of carried out credibility, identification of significant changes within each state’s cyber defence strategy and the identification of each state’s role within the development of NATO’s cyber deterrence strategy.
The research structure consists of introduction, theoretical part reflecting on deterrence theory through the context of realism and strategic studies. The second, third, fourth and fifth part of the research is devoted to case study of each state individually by using qualitative research method, focusing on publicised cybersecurity and defence strategy, existing and publicised research and publicly available information for each state’s response to cyber-attacks/campaigns within 6 year timespan due to the significant cyber attacks that have taken place during this period of time and the increased number of cyber actors. As a result, the study favours cyber deterrence by denial as the most effective and credible strategy due to the existing complications of cyber space and the lack of international regulatory cyber frameworks that would limit actors within it and could provide proportionality without escalations of response.
This master’s thesis aims to explore the cyber deterrence approaches of punishment and denial, focusing on credibility and effectiveness through the examples of NATO’s leading cyber powers: United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany and how they have responded to significant cyber-attacks from external actors. For this reason, the title of the master’s thesis is as follows: ‘Cyber deterrence by punishment and denial: approaches of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany’. The objective of the study is to analyse the credibility and effectiveness of the cyber deterrence approaches of punishment and denial adopted by the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. A research hypothesis has been established in order to compare the two cyber deterrence strategies and to identify the reasons for each state’s motivation for adopting both or either of the strategies. The hypothesis of the research is that the combined cyber deterrence of punishment and denial adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom provide greater credibility and effectiveness than deterrence by denial, adopted by France and Germany and. Likewise, five research tasks have been established in order to explore the development of deterrence theory, its relation and applicability to the cyber domain and how the concepts of cyber deterrence by punishment and denial have been applied by the four states in order to safeguard their cyber domains. In addition, the tasks set for the study looks at the frequency of carried out credibility, identification of significant changes within each state’s cyber defence strategy and the identification of each state’s role within the development of NATO’s cyber deterrence strategy. The research structure consists of introduction, theoretical part reflecting on deterrence theory through the context of realism and strategic studies. The second, third, fourth and fifth part of the research is devoted to case study of each state individually by using qualitative research method, focusing on publicised cybersecurity and defence strategy, existing and publicised research and publicly available information for each state’s response to cyber-attacks/campaigns within 6 year timespan due to the significant cyber attacks that have taken place during this period of time and the increased number of cyber actors. As a result, the study favours cyber deterrence by denial as the most effective and credible strategy due to the existing complications of cyber space and the lack of international regulatory cyber frameworks that would limit actors within it and could provide proportionality without escalations of response.
This master’s thesis aims to explore the cyber deterrence approaches of punishment and denial, focusing on credibility and effectiveness through the examples of NATO’s leading cyber powers: United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany and how they have responded to significant cyber-attacks from external actors. For this reason, the title of the master’s thesis is as follows: ‘Cyber deterrence by punishment and denial: approaches of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany’. The objective of the study is to analyse the credibility and effectiveness of the cyber deterrence approaches of punishment and denial adopted by the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. A research hypothesis has been established in order to compare the two cyber deterrence strategies and to identify the reasons for each state’s motivation for adopting both or either of the strategies. The hypothesis of the research is that the combined cyber deterrence of punishment and denial adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom provide greater credibility and effectiveness than deterrence by denial, adopted by France and Germany and. Likewise, five research tasks have been established in order to explore the development of deterrence theory, its relation and applicability to the cyber domain and how the concepts of cyber deterrence by punishment and denial have been applied by the four states in order to safeguard their cyber domains. In addition, the tasks set for the study looks at the frequency of carried out credibility, identification of significant changes within each state’s cyber defence strategy and the identification of each state’s role within the development of NATO’s cyber deterrence strategy. The research structure consists of introduction, theoretical part reflecting on deterrence theory through the context of realism and strategic studies. The second, third, fourth and fifth part of the research is devoted to case study of each state individually by using qualitative research method, focusing on publicised cybersecurity and defence strategy, existing and publicised research and publicly available information for each state’s response to cyber-attacks/campaigns within 6 year timespan due to the significant cyber attacks that have taken place during this period of time and the increased number of cyber actors. As a result, the study favours cyber deterrence by denial as the most effective and credible strategy due to the existing complications of cyber space and the lack of international regulatory cyber frameworks that would limit actors within it and could provide proportionality without escalations of response.
Description
Starptautiskā pārvaldība un diplomātija
International Governance and Diplomacy
Socioloģija, politoloģija un antropoloģija
Sociology, Politics and Anthropology
International Governance and Diplomacy
Socioloģija, politoloģija un antropoloģija
Sociology, Politics and Anthropology
Keywords
Deterrence, cyberspace, punishment, denial, credibility, effectiveness., Deterrence, cyberspace, punishment, denial, credibility, effectiveness.